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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the issue of computation of the bilateral credit valuation adjust-
ment (CVA) under rating triggers, and in presence of ratings-linked margin agreements.
Specifically, we consider collateralized OTC contracts, that are subject to rating triggers,
between two parties – an investor and a counterparty. Moreover, we model the margin
process as a functional of the credit ratings of the counterparty and the investor. We
employ a Markovian approach for modeling of the rating transitions of the two parties
to the contract. In this framework, we derive the representation for bilateral CVA. We
also introduce a new component in the decomposition of the counterparty risky price:
namely the rating valuation adjustment (RVA) that accounts for the rating triggers. We
give two examples of dynamic collateralization schemes where the margin thresholds are
linked to the credit ratings of the parties. We account for the rehypothecation risk in
the presence of independent amounts. Our results are illustrated via computation of
various counterparty risk adjustments for a CDS contract and for an IRS contract.
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1 Introduction
Modeling, managing and mitigating counterparty risk is a crucial task for all financial
institutions. One of the most popular mitigation techniques used by the market participants
is including additional termination events (ATE) in OTC transactions. As defined in Section
5(b)(vi) of the ISDA Master Agreement (see [Int02]), ATEs allow institutions to terminate
and close out the derivatives transactions with a counterparty if a termination event occurs.
We consider a particular, and in fact the most common, termination event: rating triggers.
A rating trigger is defined as a threshold credit rating level, which is agreed upon the
initiation of the contract. If the credit rating of the counterparty or the investor decreases
below the trigger level, before the maturity of the contract, the contract is terminated and
closed out. Therefore, rating triggers provide additional protection from a counterparty
with a deteriorating credit rating, by allowing the investor to terminate the contract prior
to a default event. Furthermore, since a significant credit deterioration is usually followed
by a default event, adding rating triggers serves as a cushion against any losses resulting
from such defaults. On the other hand, rating-triggers are also very effective in mitigating
counterparty credit risk.
Counterparty risk modeling has gained paramount importance since the credit crisis in
2008. As it is noted in Benjamin [Ben10], just shy of one-thirds of the losses in the crisis
were actually due to realized default events, whereas about two-thirds were due to mark-to-
market losses associated with the counterparty credit risk. Naturally, counterparty credit
risk modeling literature has grown significantly. We refer to Bielecki, Cialenco, and Iyigunler
[BCI11], Assefa, Bielecki, Crepey and Jeanblanc [ABCJ11], Brigo, Capponi, Pallavicini and
Papatheodorou [BCPP11] and also Crepey [Cre12a, Cre12b] for recent general results in
counterparty risk modeling.
On the contrary, the literature on counterparty risk modeling with rating triggers is
very limited. In Yi [Yi11], CVA valuation with rating triggers is studied for optional and
mandatory termination events, and a compound Poisson model is introduced for modeling
rating transitions and default probabilities. Zhou [Zho10] considers practical problems
regarding CVA valuation with additional termination events is considered under a simple
model from a practitioner’s point of view. Recently, Mercurio [Mer11] studied a similar
problem and introduced a valuation model by proposing several generalizing assumptions
to simplify the CVA computations considering the unilateral counterparty risk. However,
a comprehensive approach which involves the joint modeling of rating transitions in a risk-
neutral setting and the dynamic, ratings-dependent collateralization has not been studied
in the literature.
In this paper we consider the problem of collateralized bilateral CVA valuation with
rating triggers and credit migrations. We first find the CVA representation in presence of
rating triggers. We show that the value of the underlying OTC contract needs to be adjusted
also for the rating triggers. This new adjustment term is called as the rating valuation
adjustment (RVA). We show that RVA represents the expected loss in case of a default event
that is preceded by a trigger event. In the bilateral case, we see that RVA is decomposed
into two components: URVA and DRVA, representing the rating valuation adjustments for
the counterparty’s and the investor’s rating triggers. Furthermore, we consider dynamic
collateralization using the rating transitions. In this framework, the collateral thresholds
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are defined as the functionals of the current credit ratings of the counterparty and the
investor. In practice such rating-dependent margin agreements are standard and they are
described in the Credit Support Annex (CSA). Moreover, we consider the rehypothecation
risk of the collateral in the presence of independent amounts.
We employ the Markovian copula approach for modeling the joint rating transitions and
the default probabilities of the counterparty and the investor. Previously, Bielecki, Vidozzi,
and Vidozzi [BVV06, BVV08] applied Markov copulae to the collateralized debt obliga-
tions and ratings-triggered corporate step-up bonds. Theoretical aspects of the Markov
copulae can be found in Bielecki, Jakubowski, Vidozzi, and Vidozzi [BJVV08] and Bielecki,
Jakubowski, and Nieweglowski [BJN11]. We illustrate our results with numerical examples.
We analyze the impact of early termination clauses and dynamic collateralization on the
bilateral and unilateral CVA, as well as the DVA and RVA in case of a CDS and an IRS
contract.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a general framework for the
valuation of collateralized credit valuation adjustment in the presence of rating triggers. We
study dynamic collateralization in Section 2.3, and we study rehypothecation in Section 2.4.
Next, we employ the Markovian copula approach for modeling the joint rating transitions
of the counterparty and the investor in Section 3. Finally, we present numerical results in
case of a CDS contract and an IRS contract in Section 4.
2 Credit Value Adjustment and Collateralization under Rat-
ing Triggers
We consider an OTC contract between two names: the investor and the counterparty. In
the model we propose in this paper, the counterparty risk associated with this contract
will be sensitive to the current credit worthiness of the two parties. We postulate that
the creditworthiness of each party is represented by the same K := {1, 2, . . . ,K} rating
categories. We postulate that the ratings are ordered from the best, i.e. 1, to the worst,
i.e. K, with the convention that the level K corresponds to a default.
To model the evolution of the credit worthiness we introduce two right continuous pro-
cesses X1 and X2 on (Ω,G,Q), with values in K, and we denote by X1 and X2 the associated
filtrations: Xi =
(
X it
)
t≥0
with X it = σ(X
i
u, u ≤ t) for t ∈ R+, i = 1, 2.
1 Processes X1 and
X2 represent the evolution of the credit ratings of the counterparty and the investor. In
what follows we shall make additional specific assumptions about processes Xi, i = 1, 2.
We assume that we are given a market filtration F containing the information about
the relevant market variables (i.e. short rate process), and a filtration F˜ that contains the
information regarding the financial contract underlying our OTC contract. Accordingly, we
define G := F ∨ F˜ ∨ X1 ∨X2.
The savings account process B is given as,
Bt := e
∫ t
0
rsds , t ∈ [0, T ] ,
where the F-adapted process r models the short-term interest rate. We postulate that Q
represents a pricing measure corresponding to the discount factor β = B−1.
1All filtrations considered in this paper are assumed to satisfy the usual conditions.
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As noticed above, the two parties are default prone, and the respective default times
are given as
τi := inf{t > 0 : X
i
t = K} , i = 1, 2.
We shall also consider the first default time τ := τ1 ∧ τ2.
We denote by Ri ∈ [0, 1] a Gτi–measurable random variable, which represents the re-
covery rate of party i = 1, 2. In our model, the recovery rates represent the fraction of
the mark-to-market value of the underlying contract recovered from the defaulting names,
which appears in the close-out amounts.
We denote by Eρ the conditional expectation given Gρ under Q for any G stopping time
ρ.
Let D represent the counterparty risk-free cumulative dividend process of our OTC
contract over a finite time horizon [0, T ], which is the “clean” version of the contract that
does not account for the counterparty risk.2 We assume that D is of finite variation.
In accordance with the classical risk neutral valuation we define the counterparty risk-
free ex-dividend price (clean price from now on) process of the contract:
Definition 2.1. The ex-dividend price process of a counterparty risk-free contract is defined
as, 3
St = BtEt
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u dDu
]
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
The process S is also called the clean mark-to-market process. Let us also define the process
S∆ := S +∆D.
We consider collateralized contracts, therefore we define a G-predictable process C on
[0, T ] representing cumulative collateral amount in the margin account. Mechanics and the
modeling of the collateral process are discussed in Section 2.3.
2.1 Pricing Bilateral Counterparty Risk
Let us consider the case K = 2, therefore allowing only the default and the pre-default
states prevail. This case corresponds to the models presented and discussed by Bielecki et
al. [BCI11, BC11, BCJZ11] and Assefa et al. [ABCJ11].
We denote H1t := 1{τ1≤t} and H
2
t := 1{τ2≤t} as the default indicator processes of τ1 and
τ2 respectively. Note that we now have X
1
t = 1 + H
1
t and X
2
t = 1 + H
2
t . We also define
τ := τ1 ∧ τ2 as the first default time of the counterparty and the investor. Moreover, we let
H := 1{τ≤t} be the default indicator process corresponding to τ .
Let DC represent the counterparty risky cumulative dividend processes of the contract
that is subject to counterparty default risk. Therefore, given D, we define the counterparty
risky cumulative dividend process DC as follows.
2All cash flows are considered from the point of view of the investor.
3Required integrability properties are assumed implicitly.
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Definition 2.2. Counterparty-risky cumulative dividend process has the following form
Dt = (1−Ht)Dt +HtDτ− + 1{τ<T}(Cτ1{τ≤t} + (R1(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
+ − (S∆τ − Cτ )
−)1{τ=τ1≤t}
− (R2(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
− − (S∆τ − Cτ )
+)1{τ=τ2≤t} − (S
∆
τ − Cτ )1{τ=τ1=τ2≤t}) ,
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We proceed with defining the ex-dividend price of a counterparty risky contract,
Definition 2.3. The ex-dividend price process of a counterparty risky contract is given as,
St = BtEt
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u dDu
]
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Having defined a counterparty risk-free and a counterparty risky contracts, we are now
interested in the difference between their ex-dividend prices. This difference is called as the
Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA). Since we consider bilateral case, both the investor and
the counterparty can default on their contractual obligations. Therefore, we refer to the
CVA as the bilateral credit valuation adjustment.
Definition 2.4. The bilateral credit valuation adjustment is defined as,
CVAt = St − St ,
for all t ∈ [0, τ ∧ T ].
Bilateral counterparty valuation adjustment process has the following representation.
Proposition 2.1. The credit valuation adjustment process can be represented as
CVAt =BtEt
[
1{τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ (1−R1)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ (1−R2)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
−
]
, (1)
for all t ∈ [0, τ ∧ T ].
A proof of this proposition, where the underlying is assumed to be a CDS contract, can
be found in Bielecki et al. [BCI11]. Note that the bilateral CVA can be decomposed as
UCVAt = BtEt[1{τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ (1−R1)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
+] , (2)
DVAt = BtEt[1{τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ (1−R2)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
−] ,
for all t ∈ [0, τ ∧ T ]. These components represent the two legs of bilateral CVA, namely
the Unilateral Credit Valuation Adjustment (UCVA) and the Debt Valuation Adjustment
(DVA), representing the expected losses in case of the counterparty’s and the investor’s
defaults, respectively.
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2.2 Pricing Bilateral Counterparty Risk with Rating Triggers
We now proceed with introducing the rating trigger times, and the close-out cash flows in
the CVA valuation. We also show how the clean price of our OTC contract can be adjusted
for the counterparty risk and the rating triggers.
2.2.1 Trigger Times
As we already said, the counterparty risk of the OTC contract that we study in this paper
is sensitive to the creditworthiness of the investor and the counterparty. Specifically, we
consider an OTC contract that is subject to a rating trigger clause:
If the investor’s or the counterparty’s credit rating deteriorates to or below the
trigger level (except the default level), the contract is terminated and closed
out. Note that there are no MtM losses associated with the trigger events.
The trigger levels are set as K1 for the counterparty, and K2 for the investor,
4 where
1 < K1,K2 ≤ K. Let τ
R
i represent the first time that the i-th party’s credit rating crosses
the his rating trigger, that is
τRi := inf{t > 0 : X
i
t ≥ Ki} , i = 1, 2.
The corresponding rating trigger event times5 are defined as
τ̂i
R := inf{t > 0 : Xit ∈ {Ki,Ki+1, . . . ,K − 1}} , i = 1, 2,
and we set
τR := τR1 ∧ τ
R
2 and τ̂
R := τ̂1
R ∧ τ̂2
R .
Clearly, τRi = τ̂i
R ∧ τi for i = 1, 2.
We denote by HRt := 1{τR≤t} and Ĥ
R
t := 1{τ̂R≤t} the rating trigger indicator processes
including and not including the default event, respectively.
2.2.2 Cash Flows, Prices and Adjustments
The close-out portion of the cumulative dividend process of the counterparty risky contract
needs to account for the MtM exchange without incurring any losses at a trigger time other
than default. On the other hand, if a trigger event occurs simultaneously with a default
event, the deal will be settled according to the default event. Consequently, we propose the
following definition of the cumulative dividend process of the counterparty risky contract,
4It is implicitly assumed that Xi0 < Ki for i = 1, 2.
5That is, excluding default.
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Definition 2.5. The counterparty-risky cumulative dividend process of an OTC contract
subject to rating triggers is defined as
DRt = (1−H
R
t )Dt +DτR−H
R
t + 1{τR≤T}
(
CτRH
R
t
+
(
R1(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τR − CτR)
−
)
[HR,H1]t
−
(
R2(S
∆
τR − CτR)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
+
)
[HR,H2]t
−
(
S∆τR −CτR
)
[[HR,H1] ,H2]t +
(
S∆τR − CτR
)
[HR, ĤR]t
)
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Accordingly, the ex-dividend price processes associated with a counterparty risky con-
tract with rating triggers is defined as follows,
Definition 2.6. The ex-dividend price process SRt of a counterparty risky contract with
rating triggers, maturing at time T , is defined as
SRt = BtEt
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u dD
R
u
]
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We now introduce the credit valuation adjustment term when the underlying contract
is subject to rating triggers.
Definition 2.7. The bilateral credit valuation adjustment with rating triggers is defined
as,
CVARt = St − S
R
t , (3)
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
The following representation generalizes the results derived in Bielecki et al. [BCI11].
Proposition 2.2. The bilateral credit valuation adjustment defined in (3) can be represented
as
CVARt =BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
−
]
, (4)
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
Proof. Using Definition 2.5, we get,
dDt − dD
R
t = dDt − (1−H
R
t )dDt −Dt−dH
R
t +DτR−dH
R
t − 1{τR≤T}CτRdH
R
t
− 1{τR≤T}
(
R1(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τR − CτR)
−
)
d[HR,H1]t
+ 1{τR≤T}
(
R2(S
∆
τR − CτR)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
+
)
d[HR,H2]t
+ 1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − CτR)d[[H
R,H1] ,H2]t
− 1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − CτR)d[H
R, ĤR]t ,
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Integrating both sides leads to,∫
]t,T ]
B−1u (dDu − dD
R
u ) =
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu −
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u Du−dH
R
u +
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u DτR−dH
R
u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R1(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τR − CτR)
−
)
d[HR,H1]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R2(S
∆
τR − CτR)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
+
)
d[HR,H2]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − CτR)d[[H
R,H1] ,H2]u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − CτR)d[H
R, ĤR]u −
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u CτRdH
R
u .
Since, ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u DτR−dH
R
u −
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u Du−dH
R
u = 0 ,
we obtain,∫
]t,T ]
B−1u (dDu − dD
R
u ) =
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu −
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−2
u CτRdH
R
u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R1(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τR − CτR)
−
)
d[HR,H1]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R2(S
∆
τR − CτR)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
+
)
d[HR,H2]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − CτR)d[[H
R,H1] ,H2]u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − CτR)d[H
R, ĤR]u .
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Conditioning on τR, we get
1{t≤τR∧T} EτR
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u (dDu − dD
R
u )
]
= 1{t≤τR∧T} EτR
[∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u CτRdH
R
u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R1(S
∆
τR −CτR)
+ − (S∆τR − CτR)
−
)
d[HR,H1]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R2(S
∆
τR −CτR)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
+
)
d[HR,H2]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − CτR)d[[H
R,H1] ,H2]u (5)
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − CτR)d[H
R, ĤR]u
]
.
Notice that, since t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ], we have∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu =
∫
]t,τR[
B−1u H
R
u dDu +
∫
[τR,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu
=
∫
[τR,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu . (6)
Therefore,
1{t≤τR∧T}EτR
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu
]
= 1{t≤τR∧T}EτR
[ ∫
[τR,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu
]
= 1{t≤τR∧T}1{τR≤T}B
−1
τR
(SτR +∆DτR) = 1{t≤τR}1{τR≤T}B
−1
τR
(SτR +∆DτR) . (7)
Taking conditional expectation given Gt and using the tower property in (12) reads
1{t≤τR∧T}(St − S
R
t ) = 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u (dDu − dD
R
u )
]
(8)
= 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[
B−1
τR
(
1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − CτR)− (R1(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)1{τR=τ1≤T}
+ (R2(S
∆
τR − CτR)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
+)1{τR=τ2≤T}
+ (S∆τR − CτR)1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T} − (S
∆
τR − CτR)1{τR=τ̂R≤T}
)]
.
Since
(SDeltaτR − CτR) = (S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (SDeltaτR − CτR)
− ,
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it follows that (15) is equivalent to
1{t≤τR∧T}(St − S
R
t ) = 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[
B−1
τR
(
1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − CτR)
− (R1(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ + (S∆τR − CτR)− (S
∆
τR − CτR)
+)1{τR=τ1≤T}
+ (R2(S
∆
τR − CτR)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
− − (S∆τR − CτR))1{τR=τ2≤T}
+ (S∆τR − CτR)1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T} − (S
∆
τR − CτR)1{τR=τ̂R≤T}
)]
.
After simplifying the terms above, we obtain
1{t≤τR∧T}(St − S
R
t ) = 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[
B−1
τR
(
1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ (1−R1)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+
1{τR=τ1≤T} − (S
∆
τR − CτR)1{τR=τ1≤T}
− (1−R2)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
−
1{τR=τ2≤T} − (S
∆
τR − CτR)1{τR=τ2≤T}
+ (S∆τR − CτR)1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T} − (S
∆
τR − CτR)1{τR=τ̂R≤T}
)]
,
which is equivalent to
1{t≤τR∧T}(St − S
R
t ) = 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[
B−1
τR
[
1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − CτR)− 1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ (1−R1)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+
1{τR=τ1≤T} − (1−R2)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
−
1{τR=τ2≤T}
]]
.
Finally, we find that
St − S
R
t = BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
−
]
,
on the set t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ], which proves our claim.
Remark 2.3. Note that since there are no losses associated with the trigger events other
than defaults, and since CVA (as well as CVAR) only reflects the expected losses, these
cases do not appear directly in (4).
Now, similar to (2), we can define
UCVARt := BtEt[1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+] ,
DVARt := BtEt[1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
−] ,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ]. Therefore, the credit valuation adjustment representation found in (4)
can be decomposed as CVAR = UCVAR −DVAR.
Remark 2.4. Note that although banks report on DVA (or DVAR in our case) in their
earnings reports, it is not included in determining the capital levels. This is also stated in
[Ban11, Paragraph 75] as
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Derecognise in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1, all unrealised gains
and losses that have resulted from changes in the fair value of liabilities that are
due to changes in the banks own credit risk.
Therefore, Basel III framework does not allow the banks to account for DVA in their reg-
ulatory capital calculations (see also [Ban12] for a detailed discussion). The main reason
of this treatment of DVA in Basel III is to not to allow banks to have the value of their
liabilities decrease while their credit risk is increasing.
It is important to observe the difference between CVA and CVAR processes, which
indicates the change in the CVA due to rating triggers. This leads us to introduce the
following concept,
Definition 2.8. The Rating Valuation Adjustment (RVA) process, is defined as
RVAt = CVAt − CVA
R
t , (9)
for all t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
The rating valuation adjustment term defined above has the following representation.
Proposition 2.5. The RVA process can be represented as
RVAt = BtEt[1{τR<τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ −Cτ )
+]
−BtEt[1{τR<τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
−] ,
for all t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
Proof. From (1) and (4) we obtain
CVAt − CVA
R
t = BtEt
[
1{τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ (1−R1)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ (1−R2)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
−
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
+
]
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
−
]
,
which can be written as,
CVAt − CVA
R
t = BtEt
[
1{τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ1
−Cτ1)
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ2
− Cτ2)
−
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ1
− Cτ1)
+
]
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ2
− Cτ2)
−
]
.
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Therefore, simplifying the terms above yields
CVAt − CVA
R
t = BtEt
[
(1{τ=τ1≤T} − 1{τR=τ1≤T})B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ1
− Cτ1)
+
]
−BtEt
[
(1{τ=τ2≤T} − 1{τR=τ2≤T})B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ2
− Cτ2)
−
]
,
which is equivalent to
CVAt − CVA
R
t = BtEt
[
1{τR<τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ1
− Cτ1)
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR<τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ2
− Cτ2)
−
]
,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ], which proves the result in view of (9).
Remark 2.6. Note that RVA can be positive or negative. If RVA is positive then there is
a decrease in the bilateral CVA. If RVA is negative then this indicates an increase in the
bilateral CVA due to adding rating triggers. Furthermore, RVA is always non-negative in
case of measuring unilateral counterparty risk (τ2 =∞).
Let us define
URVAt : = BtEt[1{τR<τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
+] ,
DRVAt : = BtEt[1{τR<τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
−] .
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ]. Therefore, RVA has the following decomposition,
RVAt = URVAt −DRVAt ,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ]. Here URVA represents the expected loss if the counterparty defaults
first which is preceded by a rating trigger. Similarly, DRVA is the expected loss in case the
investor defaults first after a rating trigger. Therefore, including rating triggers provision in
an OTC contract provides protection from losses due to default events which happen after
a credit downgrade. Accordingly, the value of the contract is adjusted for this protection,
as shown in the following
Corollary 2.7. We have the following decomposition for the counterparty risk-free price
process
St = S
R
t + CVA
R
t
= SRt + CVAt − RVAt
= SRt + UCVAt −DVAt − RVAt
= SRt + UCVAt −DVAt − URVAt +DRVAt ,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
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2.3 Dynamic Collateralization
In bilateral margin agreements, counterparties are required to post collateral as soon as the
clean price of the contract exceeds thresholds, which are defined in CSA (see [Int94]). In
particular, these thresholds are defined in terms of the credit ratings of the counterparties.
Specifically, the collateral threshold of a counterparty decreases as a result of a credit rating
downgrade and increases as a result of a credit rating upgrade. Consequently, a counterparty
with higher credit rating will have higher threshold than a counterparty with a lower credit
rating.
It is important to note that there is an adverse relation between the margin require-
ments and the credit ratings. A credit downgrade along with higher borrowing rates and
exposures forces the companies to post increasing amounts of collateral to their counter-
parties, which can be fatal. For example, the ratings linked collateral thresholds, coupled
with rehypothecation, have been considered to be one of the key drivers of AIG’s collapse
in 2008. Before 2007, as a ‘AAA’ rated company, AIG had not been required to post any
collateral for most of its derivatives transactions. However, after several downgrades AIG
had posted more than $40 billion in collateral as of November 2008 (see [Int09] for details).
Thus, one of the key issues in modeling of the collateral process6 is the issue of mod-
eling of the thresholds. In what follows, we shall model the collateral threshold for the
counterparty at time t, say Γ1t , as Γ
1
t = γ
1(t,X1t , St), where γ
1 : [0, T ] × K × R → R+ is
a measurable function. Similarly, we shall model the collateral threshold for the investor
at time t, say Γ2t , as Γ
2
t = γ
2(t,X2t , St), where γ
2 : [0, T ] × K × R → R− is a measurable
function.
For a proper modeling of the collateral we need to consider the so called independent
amounts (i.e. initial margins) posted by the counterparty and the investor by the constants
β1 ∈ R+ and β2 ∈ R−, respectively. We also need to consider the so called minimum
transfer amount (MTA), which is a positive constant denoted by θ and the margin period
of risk, which is again a positive constant denoted by ∆.7
According to the standard industry practice collateral amounts are adjusted at fixed
tenor dates, termed margin call dates. Let us denote the margin call dates by 0 < t1 <
. . . < tn < T . On the margin call date ti, if the exposure is above the counterparty’s current
threshold, Γ1ti , and if the difference between the current exposure and the collateral amount
is greater than the MTA the counterparty posts collateral and updates the margin account;
otherwise, no collateral exchange takes place since the transfer amount is less than the
MTA. Likewise, the investor delivers collateral on the margin call date ti, if the exposure
is below investor’s threshold, Γ2ti , and the difference between the current exposure and the
collateral amount is greater than MTA (cf. [Int05], pages 52–56). Note that under these
covenants a collateral transfer is allowed only if it is greater than the MTA amount.
In accordance with the above discussion the collateral process is modeled as follows in
this paper:
6Since in this paper we only consider symmetric cash flows (form the point of view of both the parties),
we only need to model a single collateral process.
7We refer the reader to Bielecki et al. [BCI11, BC11] for a detailed discussion and definitions.
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We set C0 = 0. Then, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we define
Ct := 1{Sti+Bti (β1−β2)−Γ
1
ti
−Cti>θ}
(Sti +Bti(β1 − β2)− Γ
1
ti
−Cti)
+ 1{Sti+Bti(β2−β1)−Γ
2
ti
−Cti<−θ}
(Sti +Bti(β2 − β1)− Γ
2
ti
− Cti) + Cti ,
for t ∈ (ti, ti+1], on the set {ti < τ
R}. Moreover, Ct = CτR on the set {τ
R ≤ t ≤ τR +∆},
where ∆ represents the margin period of risk.
Observe that the collateral increments at each margin call date ti < τ
R can now be
represented as,
∆Cti : = Cti+ − Cti
= 1{Sti+Bti (β1−β2)−Γ
1
ti
−Cti>θ}
(Sti +Bti(β1 − β2)− Γ
1
ti
−Cti)
+ 1{Sti+Bti (β2−β1)−Γ
2
ti
−Cti<−θ}
(Sti +Bti(β2 − β1)− Γ
2
ti
− Cti) .
In Section 4 we assume, for simplicity, that the margin period of risk, independent
amounts and minimum transfer amount to be zero. Thus, the collateral amount at time t
(from the point of view of the investor) is given as
Ct = 1{Sti−Γ
1
ti
>Cti}
(Sti − Γ
1
ti
− Cti) + 1{Sti−Γ
2
ti
<Cti}
(Sti − Γ
2
ti
− Cti) + Cti ,
for t ∈ (ti, ti+1]. Furthermore, we consider the following structure for the collateral thresh-
olds
γi(t, x, s) = ρi(t, x)s, i = 1, 2,
where ρi : [0, T ] × K → [0, 1] is a measurable function. The functions ρ1 and ρ2 represent
the collateral rates for the counterparty and the investor at time t, respectively . Essentially,
the collateral rates indicate the percentage of exposure at time t.
We introduce two specifications of collateral rates:8
• The linear case:
ρil(t, x) :=
K − x
K − 1
for all i = 1, 2. In particular, ρi(t, 1) = 1 and ρi(t,K) = 0.
• The exponential case:
ρie(t, x) :=
{
e1−x if x < K
0 if x = K
for all i = 1, 2.
Note that in practice, the threshold levels are set in CSA documents for different rating
levels. However, here we propose two alternative methods for determining the collateral
threshold levels. In the linear case, collateral thresholds increase or decrease linearly with
8Recall that the credit ratings of each credit name take values in the set K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}, where K
represents the default and where 1 represents the highest possible rating.
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the credit qualities of the counterparties. Similarly, in the exponential case, the collateral
thresholds exponentially increase or decrease with the credit ratings. Therefore, the collat-
eral rates in the exponential case are always less than the ones in the linear case, which
leads to lower collateral thresholds, and as a result more collateral being kept in the margin
account.
2.4 Rehypothecation Risk
We now consider the case that the collateral receiver (counterparty or the investor) can
rehypothecate the collateral. Rehypothecation refers to the case that the collateral receiver
is able to freely use the collateral in the margin account for investment and funding purposes.
Let us define a Gτ1-measurable random variable R
h
1 and a Gτ2-measurable random vari-
able Rh2 as the recovery rates of the rehypothecated collateral for the investor and the
counterparty. Following Brigo et al. [BCPP11], we assume that R1 ≤ R
h
1 and R2 ≤ R
h
2 ,
since in case of a default the collateral has priority among other liabilities.
Let us now define the cumulative dividend process associated with the counterparty
risky contract with rehypothecation.
Definition 2.9. Cumulative dividend process of a counterparty risky contract that takes
rehypothecation risk into account is represented as,
DR,ht = (1−H
R
t )Dt +DτR−H
R
t + 1{τR≤T}
(
C˜τRH
R
t
+
(
R1(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
−
)
[HR,H1]t
−
(
R2(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
+
)
[HR,H2]t
−
(
S∆τR − C˜τR
)
[[HR,H1] ,H2]t +
(
S∆τR − C˜τR
)
[HR, ĤR]t
)
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ], where
C˜τR = CτR
[
1τR=τ1 6=τ2(R
h
11CRτ >0
+ 1C
τR
≤0) + 1τR=τ2 6=τ1(1CτR>0 +R
h
21CτR≤0
)
+ 1τR=τ1=τ2(R
h
11CτR>0
+Rh21CτR≤0) + 1τR=τ̂R
]
.
We are now ready to define the ex-dividend price processes associated with a counter-
party risky contract with rating triggers and rehypothecation risk.
Definition 2.10. The ex-dividend price process SR,h of a counterparty risky contract ma-
turing at time T, with rating triggers and rehypothecation risk is defined as,
S
R,h
t = BtEt
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u dD
R,h
u
]
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Next, we give the definition of credit valuation adjustment of a contract with rating
triggers in presence of rehypothecation risk.
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Definition 2.11. The credit valuation adjustment with rating triggers taking the rehy-
pothecation risk into account is defined as,
CVAR,ht = St − S
R,h
t , (10)
for all t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
This form of the counterparty-risky cumulative dividend process leads to the following
representation for the bilateral CVA.
Proposition 2.8. The bilateral Credit Valuation Adjustment process with rehypothecation
risk defined in (10) can be represented as
CVAR,ht = BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τR − C˜
1
τR)
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τR − C˜
2
τR)
−
]
, (11)
for all t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ], where
C˜1τR = CτR
[
1τR=τ1 6=τ2(R
h
11CRτ >0
+ 1C
τR
≤0) + 1τR=τ1=τ2(R
h
11CτR>0
+Rh21CτR≤0)
]
,
and
C˜2τR = CτR
[
1τR=τ2 6=τ1(1CτR>0 +R
h
21CτR≤0
) + 1τR=τ1=τ2(R
h
11CτR>0
+Rh21CτR≤0)
]
.
Proof. Using Definition 2.9, we have
dDt − dD
R,h
t = dDt − (1−H
R
t )dDt −Dt−dH
R
t +DτR−dH
R
t − 1{τR≤T}C˜τRdH
R
t
− 1{τR≤T}
(
R1(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
−
)
d[HR,H1]t
+ 1{τR≤T}
(
R2(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
+
)
d[HR,H2]t
+ 1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)d[[H
R,H1] ,H2]t
− 1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)d[H
R, H˜R]t ,
Integrating both sides leads to,∫
]t,T ]
B−1u (dDu − dD
R,h
u ) =
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu −
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u Du−dH
R
u +
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u DτR−dH
R
u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R1(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
−
)
d[HR,H1]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R2(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
+
)
d[HR,H2]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)d[[H
R,H1] ,H2]u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)d[H
R, H˜R]u −
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u C˜τRdH
R
u .
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Since, ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u DτR−dH
R
u −
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u Du−dH
R
u = 0 ,
we obtain,∫
]t,T ]
B−1u (dDu − dD
R,h
u ) =
∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu −
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−2
u C˜τRdH
R
u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R1(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
−
)
d[HR,H1]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R2(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
+
)
d[HR,H2]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)d[[H
R,H1] ,H2]u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)d[H
R, H˜R]u .
Conditioning on τR, we get
1{t≤τR∧T} EτR
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u (dDu − dD
R,h
u )
]
= 1{t≤τR∧T} EτR
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u C˜τRdH
R
u
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R1(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
−
)
d[HR,H1]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u
(
R2(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
+
)
d[HR,H2]u
+
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)d[[H
R,H1] ,H2]u (12)
−
∫
]t,T ]
1{τR≤T}B
−1
u (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)d[H
R, H˜R]u
]
.
Notice that, since t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ], we have∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu =
∫
]t,τR[
B−1u H
R
u dDu +
∫
[τR,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu
=
∫
[τR,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu . (13)
Therefore,
1{t≤τR∧T}EτR
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu
]
= 1{t≤τR∧T}EτR
[ ∫
[τR,T ]
B−1u H
R
u dDu
]
= 1{t≤τR∧T}1{τR≤T}B
−1
τR
(SτR +∆DτR) = 1{t≤τR}1{τR≤T}B
−1
τR
(SτR +∆DτR) . (14)
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Taking conditional expectation given Gt and using the tower property in (12) reads
1{t≤τR∧T}(St − S
R
t ) = 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[ ∫
]t,T ]
B−1u (dDu − dD
R,h
u )
]
(15)
= 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[
B−1
τR
(
1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− (R1(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
−)1{τR=τ1≤T}
+ (R2(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
+)1{τR=τ2≤T}
+ (S∆τR − C˜τR)1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T} − (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)1{τR=τ˜R≤T}
)]
.
Since
(S∆τR − C˜τR) = (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
− ,
it follows that (15) is equivalent to
1{t≤τR∧T}(St − S
R
t ) = 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[
B−1
τR
(
1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− (R1(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ + (S∆τR − C˜τR)− (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+)1{τR=τ1≤T}
+ (R2(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
− − (S∆τR − C˜τR)
− − (S∆τR − C˜τR))1{τR=τ2≤T}
+ (S∆τR − C˜τR)1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T} − (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)1{τR=τ˜R≤T}
)]
.
After simplifying the terms above, we obtain
1{t≤τR∧T}(St − S
R
t ) = 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[
B−1
τR
(
1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ (1−R1)(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+
1{τR=τ1≤T} − (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)1{τR=τ1≤T}
− (1−R2)(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
−
1{τR=τ2≤T} − (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)1{τR=τ2≤T}
+ (S∆τR − C˜τR)1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T} − (S
∆
τR − C˜τR)1{τR=τ˜R≤T}
)]
,
which is equivalent to
1{t≤τR∧T}(St − S
R
t ) = 1{t≤τR∧T}BtEt
[
B−1
τR
[
1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)− 1{τR≤T}(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+ (1−R1)(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+
1{τR=τ1≤T} − (1−R2)(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
−
1{τR=τ2≤T}
]]
.
Finally, we find that
St − S
R
t = BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τR − C˜τR)
−
]
,
on the set t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ], which proves our claim.
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Remark 2.9. Observe that if Rh1 = R
h
2 = 1 then CVA
R,h = CVAR.
Next, we consider the rating valuation adjustment in the presence of rehypothecation
risk.
Definition 2.12. The Rating Valuation Adjustment process (RVAh) with rehypothecation
risk is defined as
RVAht = CVAt − CVA
R,h
t ,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
We have the following representation for RVAR,h.
Lemma 2.1. RVAR,h can represented as
RVAht = RVAt
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1 6=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
1Cτ1)
+)]
+ 1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
1Cτ1)
+)
+ 1Cτ1<0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
2Cτ1)
+)]
]
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2 6=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2<0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)]
+ 1{τR=τ2=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2>0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh1Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)]
+ 1Cτ2<0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)
]
,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
Proof. Using (1) and (11) we obtain
CVAt −CVA
R,h
t = BtEt
[
1{τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ (1−R1)(S
∆
τ −Cτ )
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ (1−R2)(S
∆
τ − Cτ )
−
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τR − C˜
1
τR)
+
]
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τR − C˜
2
τR)
−
]
,
where
C˜1τR = 1τR=τ1 6=τ2(R
h
1C
+
τR
+ C−
τR
) + 1τR=τ1=τ2(R
h
1C
+
τR
+Rh2C
−
τR
) ,
and
C˜2τR = 1τR=τ2 6=τ1(C
+
τR
+Rh2C
−
τR
) + 1τR=τ1=τ2(R
h
1C
+
τR
+Rh2C
−
τR
).
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Rearranging the terms above yields
CVAt − CVA
R,h
t = BtEt
[
1{τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ!
− Cτ1)
+
]
(16)
−BtEt
[
1{τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ2
−Cτ2)
−
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ1
− C˜1τ1)
+
]
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ2
− C˜2τ2)
−
]
.
Plugging in the terms C˜1τ1 and C˜
2
τ2
into (16), we get
CVAt − CVA
R,h
t = BtEt
[
1{τ=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)(S
∆
τ!
− Cτ1)
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τ=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)(S
∆
τ2
− Cτ2)
−
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1 6=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0(S
∆
τ1
−Rh1Cτ1)
+ + 1Cτ1<0(S
∆
τ1
− Cτ1)
+)]
+ 1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0(S
∆
τ1
−Rh1Cτ1)
+ + 1Cτ1<0(S
∆
τ1
−Rh2Cτ1)
+)]
]
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2 6=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2>0(S
∆
τ2
− Cτ2)
− + 1Cτ2<0(S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
−]
+ 1{τR=τ2=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2>0(S
∆
τ2
−Rh1Cτ2)
−] + 1Cτ2<0(S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
−
]
.
It follows from (9) that
CVAt − CVA
R,h
t = RVAt +BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R1)(S
∆
τR −CτR)
+
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2≤T}B
−1
τR
(1−R2)(S
∆
τR − CτR)
−
]
−BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1 6=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0(S
∆
τ1
−Rh1Cτ1)
+ + 1Cτ1<0(S
∆
τ1
− Cτ1)
+)]
+ 1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0(S
∆
τ1
−Rh1Cτ1)
+ + 1Cτ1<0(S
∆
τ1
−Rh2Cτ1)
+)]
]
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2 6=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2>0(S
∆
τ2
− Cτ2)
− + 1Cτ2<0(S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
−]
+ 1{τR=τ2=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2>0(S
∆
τ2
−Rh1Cτ2)
−] + 1Cτ2<0(S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
−
]
.
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Finally, we find
CVAt − CVA
R,h
t = RVAt
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1 6=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
1Cτ1)
+)]
+ 1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
1Cτ1)
+)
+ 1Cτ1<0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
2Cτ1)
+)]
]
+BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2 6=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2<0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)]
+ 1{τR=τ2=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2>0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh1Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)]
+ 1Cτ2<0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)
]
,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
Remark 2.10. Note that RVAh can either be negative or positive. If the difference is positive,
then there is a decrease in the bilateral CVA, however if it is negative then there is an increase
in the bilateral CVA.
Let us define
URVAht : = BtEt
[
1{τR=τ1 6=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
1Cτ1)
+)]
+ 1{τR=τ1=τ2≤T}B
−1
τ1
(1−R1)[1Cτ1>0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
1Cτ1)
+)
+ 1Cτ1<0((S
∆
τR − CτR)
+ − (S∆τ1 −R
h
2Cτ1)
+)]
]
,
DRVAht : = BtEt
[
1{τR=τ2 6=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2<0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)]
+ 1{τR=τ2=τ1≤T}B
−1
τ2
(1−R2)[1Cτ2>0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh1Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)]
+ 1Cτ2<0((S
∆
τ2
−Rh2Cτ2)
− − (S∆τR − CτR)
−)
]
.
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ]. Therefore, RVAh has the following decomposition,
RVAht = RVAt +URVA
h
t +DRVA
h
t ,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
Here URVAh represents the expected loss if the counterparty defaults first which is
preceded by a rating trigger. Similarly, DRVAh is the expected loss in case the investor
defaults first after a rating trigger. Therefore, including rating triggers provision in an
OTC contract provides protection from losses due to default events which happen after a
credit downgrade. Accordingly, the value of the contract is adjusted for this protection, as
shown in the following
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Corollary 2.11. We have the following decomposition for the counterparty risk-free price
process
St = S
R,h
t + CVA
R,h
t
= SR,ht + CVAt − RVA
h
t
= SR,ht + UCVAt −DVAt − RVA
h
t
= SR,ht + UCVAt −DVAt − RVAt − URVA
h
t −DRVA
h
t ,
for t ∈ [0, τR ∧ T ].
3 Markovian Approach for Rating-Based Pricing
In this section, we employ Markov copulae for modeling the rating transitions in our frame-
work. Our approach is based on the studies of Bielecki et al. [BCJR06, BVV06, BVV08,
BJVV08, BJN11].
3.1 Markov Copulae for the Multivariate Markov Chains
Let us first consider two Markov chains X1 and X2 on (Ω,F ,P) with the infinitesimal
generators A1 := [a1ij ] and A
2 := [a2hk], respectively.
In what follows, we work under the following assumption.
Assumption (A) The system of equations,∑
k∈K
aXih,jk = a
1
ij , ∀i, j, h ∈ K, i 6= j, (17)
∑
j∈K
aXih,jk = a
2
hk , ∀i, h, k ∈ K, h 6= k, (18)
has a positive solution.
The proof of the following proposition can be found in [BVV08].
Proposition 3.1. If Assumption (A) is satisfied, then AX = [aXih,jk]i,h,j,k∈K (where di-
agonal elements are defined appropriately) satisfies the conditions for a generator matrix
of a bivariate time-homogeneous Markov chain, say X = (Y 1, Y 2), whose components are
Markov chains with the same laws as X1 and X2.
Hence, the resulting matrix AX = [aXih,jk]i,h,j,k∈K satisfies the conditions for a generator
matrix of a bivariate time-homogeneous Markov chain, whose marginals are Markov chains
with the same distributions as X1 and X2. Therefore, the system (17)–(18) serves as a
Markov copula between the Markovian margins Y 1, Y 2 and the bivariate Markov chain X.
Note that the system (17)–(18) can contain more unknowns than the number of equa-
tions, therefore being underdeteremined. Therefore, as it is proposed by Bielecki et al.
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[BVV08], we impose additional constraints on the variables in the system (17)–(18). We
postulate that
aXih,jk =
{
0 , if i 6= j, h 6= k, j 6= k
αmin(a1ij , a
2
hk) , if i 6= j, h 6= k, j = k
(19)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. Using the constraints (19) the system (17)–(18) becomes fully decoupled,
and we can obtain the generator of the joint process.
We interpret the constraint (19) as follows. Y 1 and Y 2 migrate according to their
marginal laws. Nevertheless, they can have the same values. The intensity of migrating to
the same rating category is measured by the parameter α. If α = 0, then the components
Y 1 and Y 2 of X migrate independently. However, if α = 1, the tendency of Y 1 and Y 2
migrating to the same categories is at maximum.
3.2 Markovian Changes of Measure
Since rating transition matrices indicate the historical default probabilities, we need switch
to the risk-neutral probabilites. In practice, the change of measure is done such a way that
the resulting risk-neutral probabilities are consistent with the default probabilities inferred
from the quoted CDS spreads. We need to apply changes of measure, while preserving
Markovian structure of the model X. Therefore, the process X, which is Markovian under
the statistical measure, will remain Markovian under the risk-neutral measure as well.
Let Y be a Markov process under P with generator A and domain D(A) and define
M
f
t :=
f(Yt)
f(Y0)
e
−
∫ t
0
Af(Ys)
f(Ys)
ds
.
The following definition is borrowed from [PR02].
Definition 3.1. A strictly positive function f ∈ D(A) is a good function if Mft is a true
(genuine) martingale with mean 1 as EP(M
f
t ) = 1.
Let f ∈ D(A) and h be a good function and define
Ahf := h−1A(fh)− fA(h) .
The proof of the following Theorem can be found in [PR02].
Theorem 3.2. Let Qh be the probability measure associated to the density process Mht .
Then Y is a Markov process under Qh with extended generator (Ah,D(A)).
If Y is a finite state Markov chain, then we have the following result.
Corollary 3.3. Let Y be a finite state Markov chain on K with cardinality K and generator
A = aij and let h = (h1, . . . , hK) be a positive vector. Then Y is a Markov process under
Qh with generator Ah = [aijhjh
−1
i ].
Using the above corollary, we can change the measure from the statistical measure P to
a risk-neutral measure Q using a vector h = (h11, h22 . . . , hKK) ∈ R
K , so that the process X
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will be a time-homogeneous Markov chain under Q. In this case, the infinitesimal generator
under Q is found as
AX = [aih,jk] ,
where
aih,jk :=
aih,jk
hjk
hih
if ih 6= jk ,
−
∑
ih 6=jk aih,jk
hjk
hih
if ih = jk .
In Bielecki et al [BVV08], it is suggested that the vector hij can be chosen as
hij = e
α1i+α2j , i, j ∈ K ,
where the parameters α1 and α2 can be estimated through calibration.
4 Applications
In this section, we illustrate our results in the context of a CDS and an IRS contract.
We postulate that our CDS and IRS contracts are subject to rating triggers, so that they
are terminated in case a trigger event occurs. We compute the adjustments we discussed
previously; namely, CVA, DVA, URVA and DRVA of the contracts for different rating trigger
levels. Moreover, we compare CVAR and CVA values and find the impact of adding rating
triggers on the adjustments.
For the sake of simplicity, we carry out our analysis with K = 4 rating categories: A,
B, C and D. The level A represents the highest rating level, whereas D corresponds to the
default state. We assume that the counterparty initially has rating A. In what follows, we
suppose that the 1-year rating transition matrix is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Counterparty’s rating transition matrix: P 1
A B C D
A 0.9 0.08 0.017 0.003
B 0.05 0.85 0.09 0.01
C 0.01 0.09 0.8 0.1
D 0 0 0 1
Moreover, we assume that the current rating of the investor is A. Investor’s 1-year
rating transition matrix is assumed to be given as in Table 2.
We assume that the rating transition matrices given above are already risk-neutral,
therefore we set α1 = α2 = 0. We also assume deterministic recovery rates; R1 = R2 = 0.4
and Rh1 = R
h
2 = 1.
4.1 CVA of an IRS with Rating Triggers
In this section, we compute the CVA, DVA, and RVA of a fixed-for-float payer 10-year IRS
contract with $1 notional, in presence of rating triggers as break clauses. We assume that
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Table 2: Investor’s rating transition matrix: P 2
A B C D
A 0.8 0.1 0.05 0.05
B 0.04 0.9 0.03 0.03
C 0.015 0.1 0.7 0.185
D 0 0 0 1
the payments are done every quarter, and the fixed leg pays the swap rate, while the floating
leg pays the LIBOR rate. We also assume that the swap is initiated at T0 := 0 and we
denote by T1 < T2 < · · · < Tn, the collection of payment dates and S by the fixed rate.
As we noted above, the rating transition matrices of the counterparty and the investor
is given by P 1 and P 2, respectively.
The cumulative dividend process of the IRS contract at time Ti is given by
DTi =
i∑
k=1
(L(Tk)− S)δk ,
where L(Ti) is time-Ti LIBOR rate and δk = Tk−Tk−1 for k = 1, 2, . . . , n. We also suppose
that the instantaneous interest rate r follows
drt = (θ − α rt)dt+ σdWt
where we set r0 = 0.05, θ = 0.1, α = 0.05 and σ = 0.01. We find the corresponding swap
rate as S = 0.0496.
We carry out our analysis for uncollateralized, linearly collateralized and exponentially
collateralized cases for α = 0 and α = 1. Our results are displayed in Tables 3–13. We
observe that the initial URVA values decrease with the decreasing counterparty trigger
levels, which we denote by K1. Similarly, the initial DRVA values also decrease when we
decrease the investor’s trigger level, which is denoted by K2. However, the RVA values,
which indicate the total bilateral adjustment due to the additional rating triggers, do not
follow a certain pattern. For example, in Table 3, although we decrease the trigger levels
from K1 = B, K2 = B to K1 = C, K2 = C, the corresponding RVA values do not
necessarily decrease, as opposed to URVA and DRVA values. We also observe from in
Tables 3–13 that adding bilateral rating triggers can actually decrease the initial bilateral
CVA values (in absolute values), compared to the case with no rating triggers, which is
K1 = D or K2 = D. For instance, in Table 3, the absolute value of CVA
R with no rating
triggers is almost three times greater than the absolute value of CVAR with K1 = B and
K2 = B. In other words, in this case adding rating triggers decreases the absolute value
of the bilateral CVA by nearly 60%. Detailed information about the change in the CVAR
values due to rating triggers can be seen in Figures 1–6 Also, it can be seen from the Tables
5,9 and 13, where α = 1, that the URVA and DRVA values are slightly higher compared to
the values in Tables 3,7 and 11, where α = 0.
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Table 3: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of an IRS, α = 0, No collateralization
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 1.21214 7.46661 -6.25446 0.20602 3.66672 -3.46070
B C 1.13272 7.60683 -6.47411 0.24496 3.94986 -3.70490
C B 0.90323 7.47735 -6.57412 0.51707 4.04024 -3.52316
C C 0.91109 7.61633 -6.70523 0.47848 3.90228 -3.42379
B D 1.20710 0 1.20710 0.23716 11.1861 -10.9490
D B 0 7.77754 -7.77754 1.50820 3.48440 -1.97620
C D 0.83628 0 0.83628 0.58417 11.4550 -10.8708
D C 0 7.76986 -7.76986 1.38051 3.87084 -2.49033
D D 0 0 0 1.40033 11.4083 -10.0080
Table 4: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS, α = 0, No collateralization
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
65.42% 62.98 % 64.80% 65.79% -9.40% 80.25% -8.61% 75.12%
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Figure 1: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 0, No collateralization
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Table 5: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of an IRS, α = 1, No collateralization
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 1.56101 8.90492 -7.34393 0.24788 3.44390 -3.19610
B C 1.39405 8.25898 -6.86493 0.14690 3.46560 -3.31870
C B 1.01004 8.91694 -7.90690 0.17087 3.39857 -3.22770
C C 1.21133 8.26267 -7.05133 0.49359 3.60699 -3.11339
B D 1.48947 0 1.48947 0.03862 12.3056 -12.2669
D B 0 8.97150 -8.97150 1.83154 3.28835 -1.45680
C D 0.99948 0 0.99948 0.06116 12.4500 -12.3889
D C 0 8.45006 -8.45006 1.63383 3.15669 -1.52285
D D 0 0 0 1.68138 12.3790 -10.6977
Table 6: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 1, No collateralization
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
70.12% 68.98% 69.83% 70.90% -14.67% 86.38% -15.81% 85.76%
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Figure 2: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 1, No collateralization
Moreover, we see that the UCVAR values start increasing as we lower the counterparty
trigger levels. We also observe that the DVAR values also increase with the decreasing
trigger levels for the investor. However, the CVAR values, that is the bilateral CVA, do not
change significantly unless we set K1 = D or K2 = D, which essentially means elimination
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Table 7: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of an IRS, α = 0, Linear collateral rate: ρil
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 0.65278 4.25839 -3.60560 0.16258 1.79760 -1.63502
B C 0.60496 3.17065 -2.56569 0.18720 3.02070 -2.83349
C B 0.42969 4.23383 -3.80413 0.42137 1.88225 -1.46087
C C 0.43839 3.20526 -2.76687 0.38831 3.01006 -2.62174
B D 0.67613 0 0.67613 0.18604 6.04750 -5.86146
D B 0 4.37787 -4.37787 0.91087 1.68992 -0.77911
C D 0.43038 0 0.43038 0.46165 6.08349 -5.62184
D C 0 3.26057 -2.43012 0.83045 2.97872 -2.14826
D D 0 0 0 0.83666 6.11896 -5.28229
of rating triggers.
Table 8: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 0, Linear collateral rate: ρil
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
69.05% 46.36% 72.34% 50.37% -10.97% 85.25% -6.43% 59.33%
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Figure 3: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 0, Linear collateral rate: ρil
We note that DRVA values are equal to zero whenever K2 = D. This is because by
setting the investors trigger to level D, we simply do not to have any ratings adjustments
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Table 9: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of an IRS, α = 1, Linear collateral rate: ρil
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 0.90873 4.95255 -4.04382 0.21863 1.63945 -1.42081
B C 0.77176 3.57184 -2.80007 0.14690 2.65780 -2.51090
C B 0.50178 4.97124 -4.46946 0.17087 1.61150 -1.44063
C C 0.61942 3.58533 -2.96590 0.41343 2.74593 -2.33249
B D 0.85003 0 -0.85003 0.03862 6.60363 -6.56500
D B 0 5.02376 -5.02376 1.12596 1.52697 -0.40100
C D 0.48810 0 0.48810 0.06116 6.68342 -6.62226
D C 0 3.65312 -3.65312 0.97908 2.41592 -1.43683
D D 0 0 0 1.06488 6.75473 -5.68985
for the investor. Similarly, we see that the URVA values are equal to zero where K1 = D.
Naturally, the case K1 = D and K2 = D corresponds to the CVA computation without any
rating triggers.
Table 10: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 1, Linear collateral rate: ρil
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
75.03% 55.84% 74.68% 59.01% -15.38% 92.95% -16.39% 74.75%
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Figure 4: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 1, Linear collateral rate: ρil
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Table 11: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of an IRS, α = 0, Exponential collateral
rate: ρie
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 0.37784 2.47245 -2.09460 0.14968 1.24248 -1.09280
B C 0.33067 1.54366 -1.21298 0.17005 2.18783 -2.01777
C B 0.22534 2.40717 -2.18183 0.33559 1.24133 -0.90573
C C 0.23310 1.57223 -1.33913 0.30749 2.21030 -1.90281
B D 0.38613 0 0.38613 0.17085 3.69667 -3.52582
D B 0 2.53262 -2.53262 0.58359 1.15705 -0.57345
C D 0.23556 0 0.23556 0.35182 3.65194 -3.30011
D C 0 1.60587 -1.60587 0.54372 2.17905 -1.63533
D D 0 0 0 0.54108 3.70621 -3.16512
Table 12: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 0, Exponential collateral rate: ρie
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
65.47% 36.25% 71.38% 39.88% -11.40% 81.88% -4.27% 48.33%
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Figure 5: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 0, Exponential collateral rate: ρie
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Table 13: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of an IRS, α = 1, Exponential collateral
rate: ρie
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 0.54239 2.8266 -2.2842 0.20994 1.1035 -0.89356
B C 0.43664 1.7910 -1.3544 0.14690 1.9337 -1.7868
C B 0.26953 2.8503 -2.5807 0.17087 1.0807 -0.90987
C C 0.34294 1.8238 -1.4809 0.34158 1.9741 -1.6325
B D 0.50140 0 0.50140 0.038628 3.9588 -3.9202
D B 0 2.8784 -2.8784 0.76099 1.0038 -0.24285
C D 0.26414 0 0.26414 6.1162 3.9915 -3.9304
D C 0 1.8357 -1.8357 0.61978 1.7519 -1.1321
D D 0 0 0 0.73056 4.0954 -3.3648
Table 14: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 1, Exponential collateral rate: ρie
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
73.44% 46.90% 72.96% 51.48% -16.50% 92.78% -16.81% 66.35%
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Figure 6: Mitigation in the CVA of an IRS (in %), α = 1, Exponential collateral rate: ρie
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4.2 CVA of a CDS with Rating Triggers
In this section, we compute the CVA, DVA, and RVA of a CDS contract in presence of rating
triggers as break clauses. Recall that D represents the counterparty risk-free cumulative
dividend process of a contract. We assume that the reference entity is free of any trigger
events. We denote by τ3 the default time of the reference entity and R3 the recovery rate of
the reference entity. We assume that the CDS contract has spread κ, expires at T and has
nominal value of 1. Consequently, the cumulative dividend process of the CDS contract is
given by
Dt = (1−R3)1{τ3≤t} − κ(t ∧ T ∧ τ) ,
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We also assume that the underlying entity’s 1-year rating transition matrix
is given as in Table 15.
Table 15: Underlying entity’s rating transition matrix: P 3
A B C D
A 0.95 0.03 0.019 0.001
B 0.04 0.85 0.107 0.003
C 0.01 0.19 0.791 0.009
D 0 0 0 1
Similar to the IRS example, we carry out our analysis for uncollateralized, linearly
collateralized and exponentially collateralized CDS contracts where α = 0 and α = 1. We
display our results in Tables 16–26.
The initial URVA values increase with the increasing counterparty trigger levels, and
the initial DRVA values increase with the increasing investor trigger levels. However, the
absolute values of the RVA numbers can increase or decrease with the changing trigger
levels. For example, in Table 16, although we decrease the trigger levels from K1 = B,
K2 = B to K1 = C, K2 = C, the corresponding RVA values (in absolute terms) do not
necessarily decrease, compared to the URVA and DRVA values.
It can also be observed from in Tables 16–26 that bilateral rating triggers can actually
decrease the initial bilateral CVA values (in absolute values). For instance, the absolute
value of CVAR in Table 16 with no rating triggers is almost three times greater than the
absolute value of CVAR with K1 = B and K2 = B. In addition, the UCVA
R values with
no rating triggers are also almost three times greater than the UCVAR values with K1 = B
and K2 = B. Similarly, the DVA
R values with no rating triggers are almost four times
greater than the UCVAR values with K1 = B and K2 = B. In other words, in in Table 16,
adding rating triggers decreases the UCVAR value by nearly 60%, DVAR value by nearly
75%, and the absolute value of the bilateral CVAR by nearly 60%. Figures 7–12 present
the changes in the CVA values for each set of rating triggers.
Also, it can be seen from the Tables 18,22 and 26, where α = 1, that the URVA and
DRVA values are slightly higher compared to the values in Tables 16,20 and 24, where
α = 0.
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Table 16: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of a CDS, α = 0, No collateralization
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 3.49263 35.1382 -31.6455 2.19456 17.2300 -15.0354
B C 3.42122 34.1546 -30.7334 2.57973 1.63840 -13.8043
C B 1.85901 34.6593 -32.8003 4.24977 15.4880 -11.2382
C C 1.88374 34.1047 -34.2210 4.29976 18.6530 -14.3532
B D 3.20465 0 3.20465 2.13971 50.1943 -48.0545
D B 0 37.4041 -37.4041 5.55227 15.0221 -9.46991
C D 1.86450 0 1.86450 3.82623 51.2675 -47.4413
D C 0 34.2917 -34.2917 5.60762 16.0293 -10.4217
D D 0 0 0 5.95988 53.8175 -47.8576
Moreover, it can be seen from Tables 16–26 the UCVAR values start increasing as
we lower the counterparty trigger levels. Similarly, the DVAR values also increase with
the decreasing trigger levels for the investor. However, the CVAR values do not change
significantly unless we set K1 = D or K2 = D, or eliminate the rating triggers.
Table 17: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 0, No collateralization
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
68.58% 71.15% 76.52% 70.01% -0.41% 80.21% 0.87% 78.22%
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Figure 7: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 0, No collateralization
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Table 18: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of a CDS, α = 1, No collateralization
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 5.50082 37.8154 -32.3146 2.55096 17.8533 -15.3024
B C 5.10706 36.0968 -30.9897 2.08154 15.6063 -13.5248
C B 3.00767 37.8859 -34.8782 1.94981 16.9493 -14.9994
C C 3.08081 37.4707 -34.3899 4.65988 17.8180 -13.1581
B D 5.54867 0 5.54867 3.18332 47.0143 -43.8309
D B 0 38.7167 -38.7167 32.1677 17.7398 -14.5230
C D 2.98910 0 2.98910 5.39572 50.2480 -44.8523
D C 0 37.6789 -37.6789 7.41472 18.1496 -10.7349
D D 0 0 0 8.96186 56.8067 -47.8448
The DRVA values are equal to zero whenever K2 = D, and the URVA values are equal
to zero where K1 = D, since the rating triggers are set to the default levels.
Table 19: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 1, No collateralization
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
68.02% 71.73% 68.65% 72.50% 8.39% 69.65% 6.25% 77.56%
D
C
B
D
C
B
−10%
0
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Counterparty’s Trigger
Investor’s Trigger
CV
A 
Re
du
ct
io
n
Figure 8: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 1, No collateralization
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Table 20: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of a CDS, α = 0, Linear collateral rate:
ρil
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 1.82768 19.3189 -17.4912 1.85172 8.54391 -6.69219
B C 2.20520 15.4545 -13.2493 2.43304 12.2874 -9.85440
C B 0.70377 19.7287 -19.0249 3.23993 8.37492 -5.13498
C C 0.75460 14.9528 -14.1982 3.8625 13.734 -9.8717
B D 1.75961 0 1.75961 2.01114 28.6036 -26.5925
D B 0 21.3386 -21.3386 3.94483 8.31585 -4.37102
C D 0.83638 0 0.83638 3.20253 28.1376 -24.9351
D C 0 14.3316 -14.3316 3.96853 12.6725 -8.70399
D D 0 0 0 4.08131 30.1705 -26.0892
Table 21: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 0, Linear collateral rate: ρil
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
74.35% 62.23% 80.32% 62.16% -1.93% 83.25% 4.42% 66.64%
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Figure 9: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 0, Linear collateral rate: ρil
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Table 22: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of a CDS, α = 1, Linear collateral rate:
ρil
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 3.20625 20.8636 -17.6574 2.04873 9.17156 -7.12283
B C 3.20643 15.2936 -12.0872 2.09685 12.1584 -10.0616
C B 1.27267 22.9444 -21.6717 2.03668 8.75374 -6.71706
C C 1.10322 15.9222 -14.8190 3.53085 12.8222 -9.29137
B D 3.20643 0 3.20643 2.46990 25.4939 -23.0240
D B 0 22.9444 -22.9444 2.18442 8.81189 -6.62742
C D 1.38153 0 1.38153 4.55091 27.8220 -23.2711
D C 0 16.3974 -16.3974 5.33103 14.4275 -9.09652
D D 0 0 0 5.86474 29.8551 -23.9904
Table 23: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 1, Linear collateral rate: ρil
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
70.31% 58.06% 72% 61.27% 4.03% 72.37% 3% 62.08%
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Figure 10: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 1, Linear collateral rate: ρil
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Table 24: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of a CDS, α = 0, Exponential collateral
rate: ρie
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 0.98820 11.0877 -10.0994 1.79938 6.15293 -4.35355
B C 1.26294 7.94327 -6.68033 2.33252 9.20794 -6.87542
C B 0.33328 11.3906 -11.0573 2.71652 6.23845 -3.52192
C C 0.34274 7.53087 -7.18812 3.14017 10.4728 -7.33268
B D 0.98106 0 0.98106 1.93606 18.0396 -16.1036
D B 0 12.6680 -12.6680 2.98248 6.16772 -3.18523
C D 0.39375 0 0.39375 2.75329 17.6440 -14.8907
D C 0 7.15044 -7.15044 3.01623 9.48455 -6.46832
D D 0 0 0 3.19195 18.7888 -15.5969
Table 25: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 0, Exponential collateral rate: ρie
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
72.09% 55.92% 77.42% 52.98% -3.25% 79.58% 4.53% 58.53%
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Figure 11: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 0, Exponential collateral rate: ρie
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Table 26: CVA and RVA (1$ ×10−3) components of a CDS, α = 1, Exponential collateral
rate: ρie
K1 K2 URVA DRVA RVA UCVA
R DVAR CVAR
B B 1.80010 11.7752 -9.97518 2.84797 6.92726 -4.07929
B C 1.88120 8.29421 -6.41300 2.17836 8.83311 -6.65475
C B 0.64039 13.1186 -12.4782 2.07924 6.89925 -4.82001
C C 0.62521 8.91043 -8.28522 3.26987 10.3745 -7.10464
B D 1.69567 0 1.69567 2.62547 15.2304 -12.6049
D B 0 11.7182 -11.7182 2.76178 7.08910 -4.32731
C D 0.747189 0 0.747189 4.13449 16.4391 -12.3047
D C 0 8.78431 -8.78431 3.61762 10.3593 -6.74173
D D 0 0 0 4.08585 19.2965 -15.2107
Table 27: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %), α = 1, Exponential collateral rate: ρie
(B,B) (B,C) (C,B) (C,C) (B,D) (D,B) (C,D) (D,C)
73.18% 56.25% 68.31% 53.29% 17.13% 71.55% 19.11% 55.68%
D
C
B
D
C
B
−10%
0
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Counterparty’s Trigger
Investor’s Trigger
CV
A 
Re
du
ct
io
n
Figure 12: Mitigation in the CVA of a CDS (in %) (in %), α = 1, Exponential collateral
rate: ρie
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